The mediated semi-quantum key distribution (MSQKD) protocol is an important research issue that lets two classical participants share secret keys securely between each other with the help of a third party (TP).
Introduction
To establish a secure communication, any two participants must share a secret key. Therefore, the key distribution protocol is a fundamental part in cyber security research. In 1984, Bennet and Brassard [1] used the properties of quantum mechanics to propose the first quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol -BB84 [1] . Further, some studies [2] [3] [4] proved that the BB84 protocol is unconditionally secure. In the classical cryptography, only one-time pad can conform to the unconditionally secure ciphers. Following the BB84 protocol, various QKD protocols [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] have been proposed. However, these QKD protocols assume that the protocol participants have complete quantum capabilities, implying that the participants can generate any type of quanta (single photons or entanglement states), store these qubits in quantum memory, and measure the qubits using any basis, among others. Most of these quantum capabilities are expensive and they are difficult to implement at present. To improve the practicality of the QKD protocol, Boyer et al. [15, 16] defined the semi-quantum concept and proposed the first semi-quantum key distribution (SQKD) protocol that consists of two types of participants: the quantum participant and the classical participant. The quantum participant has complete quantum capabilities, whereas the classical participant only owns limited quantum capabilities.
After the semi-quantum environment was proposed, various kinds of semi-quantum protocols have been proposed for different security issues, some of which are SQKD for different situations [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , semi-quantum communication [27] [28] [29] , semi-quantum secret sharing [30] [31] [32] , semi-quantum private comparison [33, 34] , and semi-quantum information splitting [35] , among others. According to the existing semi-quantum protocols , this study summarizes the semi-quantum environments and the quantum capabilities of the classical participants in Table 1 . 
Measure-Resend Environment
• generating Z-basis qubits
• Z-basis measurement
• reflecting photons without disturbance
Randomization-Based Environment
• reordering photons using different delay lines
Measurement-Free Environment
Unitary Operation Based Environment
• performing unitary operations
Although the SQKD protocols are more practical than the QKD protocol, the existing SQKD protocols are unable to let two classical participants share the secret key. Fortunately, Krawec [23] proposed the first mediated semi-quantum key distribution (MSQKD) protocol to resolve this issue, in which two classical participants can distribute the secret key with the help of a quantum third party (TP). Here, the trustworthiness of a TP can be categorized into the four levels summarized in Table 2 , based on [36] . The trustworthiness of TP in Krawec's protocol belongs to a dishonest TP. Table 2 . Trustworthiness levels of TP
Trustworthiness Level Definition

Honest TP
The TP has to follow the procedure of the protocol honestly and the participants can completely trust it. Therefore, the participants can share their secret information with the TP. However, the assumption of a trustworthy TP may be impractical.
Semi-honest TP
The TP has to execute the protocol loyally but it may try to obtain the participants' secret information passively using the records of all intermediate transmissions and computations by the participants.
Almost dishonest TP
To extract the participants' secret information, the TP may perform any possible attacks except collaborating with other participants. greater than T1 or T2, the original information in the qubits cannot be obtained. Therefore, the TP and the participants must spend more to maintain the qubits in a two-way quantum communication. Tsai et al. [26] proposed a lightweight MSQKD protocol without the abovementioned issues; however, the trustworthiness of the TP is assumed to be honest, which may be impractical.
In this study, we propose a mediated semi-quantum key distribution protocol with a dishonest TP. In the proposed protocol, the TP takes Bell states   ,   as quantum resources to assist the two classical participants in distributing the secret key but the TP cannot obtain any information about this secret key even if it performs any possible attack. In contrast, the classical participants only need two quantum properties including (1) Z-basis measurement and (2) performing unitary operations. The proposed protocol maintains the lightweight property in terms of the quantum capabilities of the classical participant. Moreover, the oneway quantum communication strategy is adopted to design the protocol, and thus the proposed protocol is immune to Trojan horse attacks, implying that the classical participants do not equip any Trojan Horse detector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the quantum properties used in the proposed protocol and the proposed lightweight mediated semi-quantum key distribution (LMSQKD) protocol. Section 3 presents the security analyses of the proposed LMSQKD protocol and then provides comparisons between the state-of-the-art MSQKD protocols in Section 4. Finally, the conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Proposed SQSS Protocol.
In this section, the assumptions, quantum capability limitations of the classical participants, and the quantum properties used in the proposed protocol are described, and a lightweight mediated semi-quantum key distribution protocol is proposed.
In this study, we assume that two classical participants, Alice and Bob, want to share the secret key with the help of a TP, where the TP is dishonest (i.e., TP may perform any possible attack to compromise the distributed key). There are ideal quantum channels between the TP and each classical participant (i.e., Alice and Bob). The classical channel between Alice and Bos is assumed to be authenticated. This study assumes that a classical participant has two quantum capabilities including (1) measuring the qubit using Z-basis   0 , 1 and (2) performing the unitary operation, i.e., the Hadamard operator H, where H is defined as follows:
( )
However, the TP needs to generate the Bell states   ,  , which are defined as follows:
( ) The related assumptions and limitations in this study are summarized in Table 2 .
Table 2. Summary of Assumptions and Limitations
Assumption and Limitation Description
Capacities of classical users (1) Performing H operation To enable Alice and Bob to share the secret key with the help of the TP, this study uses a quantum property:
the relationship between Bell states and Hadamard operator. Here, Alice and Bob randomly decide to implement the identity operator I (i.e., do nothing) or Hadamard operator H on one of the two qubits (i.e.,
Alice implements the unitary operator on the first qubit of the Bell states and Bob implements the unitary operator on the second qubit). Then, they measure the qubits using Z-basis. The relationships between their implemented operators and measurement results are summarized in the following According to the above-mentioned relationship, we can determine the two cases as follows.
Case 1:
Alice and Bob can use their measurement results as the raw key bits or checking bits when they perform the same operations.
Case 2: When they use different operations, they will discard the measurement results owing to the uncertain measurement results (i.e., Alice cannot use her measurement results to infer Bob's).
It should be noted that the measurement results are pure-random values in accordance with the property of measurements in Bell states, implying that Alice and Bob will share a one-time pad key (pure-random key) using this quantum property. That is, the participants do not spend the extra cost for generating the purerandom key.
This study assumes that Alice and Bob want to distribute an n-bit secret key. The steps of the proposed LMSQKD protocol are described as follows (also shown in Figure 1 ).
Step 1. TP generates a Bell state from   ,  randomly and then, sends the first and second qubits of the Bell state to Alice and Bob, respectively.
Step 2. After receiving the qubit, Alice (Bob) performs H or I operation on the qubit with the probabilities of a P ( TP, Alice, and Bob repeat Step 1 and Step 2 n times.
Step 3. TP announces the information about the initial states of Bell states to Alice and Bob using the classical channel. Then, Alice and Bob check whether the numbers of the four Bell states announced by the TP are balanced or not. If they are balanced, Alice and Bob will continue the following steps; otherwise, they will abort this session and restart the protocol.
Step 4. According to Table 3 , Alice and Bob discard the useless measurement results and choose the enough remaining measurement results as the checking bits (e.g., using 50% measurement results)
to perform Public Discussion [1] to detect outsider or insider attackers using the authenticated classical channel. If the error rate is more than the pre-defined threshold, they will terminate the protocol and restart from the beginning; otherwise, they will continue the protocol.
Step 5. Alice and Bob use the remaining measurement results in Step 4 and the relationship shown in Table 3 to obtain the raw key bits, and then perform privacy amplification [38] on the raw key bits to obtain the distributed secret key. Generally, Alice and Bob will obtain 4 n -bit secret key if 0. 
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed LMSQKD protocol. In terms of security analysis, the collective attack is a very important class of attacks because most of the well-known attacks, such as modification attack and intercept-and-resend attack, belong to it [39] . Furthermore, the collective attack is considered the strongest joint attack [40] (the most general attack). Thus, a complete collective attack analysis is given first, followed by the analysis of the fake photons attack and, the Trojan horse attack.
Collective Attack
For the collective attack, there are two types of analyses. In the first type of analysis, we need to prove that the attacker cannot obtain useful information without disturbing the original quantum system (i.e., if the attacker wants to obtain useful information, they will disturb the original system and the attack will be detected). In the second type of analysis, the amount of information that the attacker can obtain is analyzed.
In this study, we want to use the first type of analysis to prove that the proposed protocol can be secure against the collective attack. It should be noted that a dishonest TP has more advantages than an outside attacker.
Therefore, we consider the TP as an attacker to discuss the security of the proposed protocol.
Before analyzing this attack, we first define the collective attack as follows:
(1) TP can insert its ancillary qubits in each quantum system transmitted on the quantum channel and then measure the ancillary qubits to obtain Alice's or Bob's secret key bit.
(2) Each quantum system sent between the users is attacked by the TP independently using the same strategy.
(3) The TP can keep the ancillary qubits until any later time, implying that it can measure the ancillary qubits after obtaining some information originating from this attack. Therefore, a dishonest TP will perform a unitary operation E U to entangle the initial quantum system (here, the initial quantum system is the Bell state) with its prepared ancillary qubits   Because Alice and Bob discard the measurement results when they implement different operators, we only consider the following two situations: (1) Alice and Bob both implement the I operator and (2) they both implement the H operator.
For the first situation, the quantum system can be given as follows. 
Here, TP can also distinguish the four states 0 0 a e a e a e a e − − + because these states are still orthogonal to each other, implying that TP can also obtain Alice's and Bob's measurement results in the second situation.
In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob take the public discussion to check their measurement result in Step 4. Thus, TP must adjust E U to avoid the participants' check. If TP adjusts E U for the first situation, it will set 1 a and 2 a as 0 to avoid the classical participants' public discussion. However, according to this setting, the quantum system of the second situation will be given as follows. 
To avoid the classical participants' public discussion, TP must set a e a e = , TP cannot obtain any information about the classical participant's measurement results by using the ancillary qubits. participants' raw key if its attack has not been detected by Alice and Bob. In contrast, if TP wants to make the ancillary qubits distinguishable, its attack will be detected because the classical participants' measurement results do not conform to Table 3 . Thus, the proposed LMSQKD protocol is immune to the collective attacks.
Fake photons attack
In the proposed protocol, Alice and Bob use the measurement results of Z-basis to be the secret keys.
Therefore, in addition to inserting the ancillary qubits in each quantum system transmitted on the quantum channel, TP can also use the other quantum system instead of Bell states to manipulate the classical participants' measurement results and then steal their secret keys.
The TP can take a single photon pair using Z-basis instead of Bell states, where the states of a single photon pair are generated depending on the original Bell state. Step 1 of the proposed protocol, respectively. Because the photon pairs are generated by TP, it can determine the classical participants' measurement results and then infer the information of the secret key bits. Unfortunately, TP's attack can be detected by Alice and Bob in
Step 4 because it has no information about the operators implemented by Alice and Bob in Step 2. This implies that when both Alice and Bob implement the H operator on the single photon pair, their measurement results may violate the relationship shown in Table 3 with the probability of 1 2 . Taking an example to explain 
− = −
) to avoid the abovementioned detection, its attack can still be determined by Alice and Bob when they both implement the I operator in Step 2. The detection probability for the fake photon attack is
, where m denotes Alice and Bob using m measurement results for the public discussion. It implies that if m is large enough, the detection probability will approach 1, that is, the proposed protocol is robust against fake photon attack.
Trojan horse attack
In terms of implementation-dependent attacks, Trojan horse attack [41] [42] [43] is common. In Trojan horse attack, the attacker can insert the probing photons into the qubits sent from the TP. Then, the attacker attempts to obtain Alice's and Bob's secret key bits using these probing photons. However, in the proposed protocol, the quantum transmission strategy of qubits works one way, implying that the qubits are only sent from the TP to the classical participants. Although the attacker can insert probing photons into the qubits, they cannot extract any information about the participants' secret key because the probing photons cannot be retrieved.
Therefore, the proposed protocol is immune to the Trojan horse attack. Hence, the classical participants do not need to be equipped with expensive devices (such as the photon number splitter and optical wavelength filter devices) to avoid Trojan horse attacks. Furthermore, we compared the proposed MSQKD to other protocols in terms of qubit efficiency, which is defined by the following equation [44, 45] . requires the qubits to be reordered. Therefore, the time taken to maintain the qubits increases to r, to reorder the qubits, and thus the maintain time should increase r which is the time of reordering the qubit sequence. In contrast, the protocols proposed by Tsai et al. and this study only spend time t to maintain the qubits because they adopted the one-way quantum communication. Figure 2 shows the time taken to maintain the qubits for two-way and one-way quantum communications. Excluding the protocols proposed by Tsai et al. and this study, the classical participants need to be equipped with Trojan horse attack detectors.
Performance Comparison
Figure 2. Time of maintaining qubits
All comparisons are summarized in Table 4 . According to the above-mentioned comparison issues, our protocol is better than other MSQDK protocols in terms of practical implementation. 
Conclusions
To make the mediated key distribution protocol more practical, this study proposed a lightweight mediated semi-quantum key distribution protocol to enable the sharing of secret keys between two classical participants with the help of a dishonest TP, in which the classical participants only need to be equipped with two quantum devices. The proposed protocol adopts one-way quantum communication to reduce the time of preventing the qubits from decoherence and avoid the use of Trojan horse detectors. The security analysis and performance comparison are presented to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is secure and efficient. The key rate bound of the same semi-quantum key distribution protocol was discussed by Krawec [46] and thus, whether this work can be extended to analyze our protocol will be an important issue for future research.
